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Abstract Time-diary data from 27 countries show a negative relationship
between GDP per-capita and gender differences in total work—for pay and
at home. In rich non-Catholic countries, men and women average about the
same amount of total work. Survey results show scholars and the general
public believe that women work more. Widespread average equality does
not arise from gender differences in the price of time, intra-family bargaining
or spousal complementarity. Several theories, including ones based on social
norms, might explain these findings and are consistent with evidence from the
World Values Surveys and microeconomic data from Australia and Germany.
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1 Introduction
Men engage in more market work than women. What have not been thor-
oughly examined, and indeed have been almost ignored by economists, are
gender differences in the total amount of work—the sum of work in the
market and at home. Despite the obvious importance of looking more closely
at how people spend their non-work time, relatively little attention has been
paid to describing its patterns and examining its determinants. A few studies
have considered how the price of time affects the distribution of non-work
time (Biddle and Hamermesh 1990; Kalenkoski et al. 2009); and Freeman
and Schettkat (2005) have examined possible trade-offs between market and
non-market work in a few countries. This line of inquiry has been limited by
the relative paucity of available data sets. This absence of data has begun
to change, and that change enables us to examine gender differences in the
allocation of total work time.
The issue of gender differences in time use is important for a number of
reasons. First, because the amount of work (and thus the utility from leisure) is
one of the crucial arguing points in the “gender wars,” simply discovering new
facts about it is important. Second, the determinants of those facts allow infer-
ring how patterns of work by gender change as economies develop. Third, by
generating new explanations for patterns of gender differences in the amount
of total work, we may provide an impetus for using similar theories to examine
other differences in the allocation of time. Finally, these facts and the related
theoretical discussion impose restrictions on a variety of economic models.
Our purposes here are to document in much greater detail a fact that has
been essentially ignored by economists and that appears unknown to the
public, and to offer and test some explanations for it. In the next section,
we describe what we mean by market and household work and examine the
gender breakdown of work at home and in the market using time-diary data
from 27 countries. Whether the facts that we adduce in Section 2 are novel, and
whether they are already widely known, are examined in Section 3. Section 4
considers some possible explanations of our findings and indicates which ones
seem inconsistent with aggregate data. Section 5 examines some microecono-
metric evidence. The end result is a variety of facts and the ability to rule
out some explanations for them. Section 6 indicates how these considerations
might be used to inform how we model a variety of economic behavior.
2 Gender differences in market and home work
In order to examine gender differences in work we need to devise general
rules that allow activities to be classified as work. We follow standard practice,
defining market work as time spent for pay (or in unpaid household production
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for the market). We assume people would not be working the marginal hour
in the market if they were not paid. In the economics literature market work
has generally been treated as the complement of the aggregate of all activities
outside the market—implicitly all uses of non-market time have been assumed
to be aggregable.
Household work includes those activities that satisfy the third-party rule
(Reid 1934) that substituting market goods and services for one’s own time
is possible. We define total work as the sum of time spent in market work
and household production. Note that we do not and cannot examine gender
differences in the consumption value of the average or marginal minute of
market or household production; all we do here is estimate, and then try to
explain differences in the total amount of time spent in productive activities.
Throughout this initial empirical section we define the aggregates of activ-
ities as similarly as possible across the countries under study. Respondents in
these studies are given a time-diary for one or more recent days and asked to
account for all time during that day. The respondent either works from a set
of codes indicating specific activities, or the survey team codes the descriptions
into a pre-determined set of categories.
Time-diaries have the virtue of forcing respondents to report a time alloca-
tion that adds to 24 h in a day. Also, unlike retrospective data about last year’s
or even last week’s work time, while the time-diary information is necessarily
based on recall, the recall period is only one day. The shorter recall period
and the implicit time-budget constraint suggest that information on market
work from time diaries is likely to be more reliable than the recall data on
time use from standard household surveys. Most crucially, time diaries provide
information on non-market activities that is generally unavailable in labor-
force surveys.
The aggregates from Australia, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, the
United States and Israel used here represent our own calculations from micro
data. We added aggregations based on published summaries of recent time-
diary studies from seven wealthy European countries (Belgium, Denmark,
France, Finland, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and Norway) and three tran-
sition countries (Estonia, Hungary and Slovenia) from Aliaga and Winqvist
(2003); from various published summaries describing the results of time-diary
studies conducted since 1992 in Canada, Ireland, Japan and New Zealand, and
Benin, Madagascar, Mauritius and South Africa (from Blackden and Wooden
2006), and from Mexico and Turkey.1
Definitions of total work are shown in the Appendix. Obviously, they are
not identical across countries—but they are identical across gender within
country. We cannot prove the absence of a systematic bias in the aggregations
of results in each diary toward counting as work activities those performed
1While a few of the underlying micro data sets are available, most are not, thus necessitating our
reliance on published sub-aggregates in constructing the aggregates of total work. These countries
represent the entire set for which we could find appropriate data.







































Fig. 1 Female total work against male total work, 27 countries (non-Catholic (upper parallel line),
Catholic (lower parallel line), equality of total work (45◦-line)). The country abbreviations are
listed in the Appendix
especially by one gender or the other; but for our cross-country results to be
biased would require systematic errors that are the same in most countries’
methods of categorizing work activities.
Among the 27 countries, women’s (unweighted) average total work is
446.4 min per day (s.e. = 8.6), men’s is 421.7 min (s.e. = 8.9). Women’s total
work significantly exceeds men’s in this sample, albeit not by a huge amount.
If we restrict the sample to the 14 wealthy non-Catholic countries (2002 real
GDP/capita above $15,000, from Heston et al. 2006), the averages are 440.1
(s.e. = 7.4) and 431.4 (s.e. = 7.5) respectively, a statistically insignificant gender
difference in total work.2 We refer to this striking outcome henceforth as the
iso-work phenomenon. This finding implies that there also is gender equality
in the total of non-work time consumed in rich nations that lack a Catholic
cultural background.
The scatter diagram in Fig. 1 compares men’s and women’s total work in the
27 countries. The steepest line shows what women’s total work would be if it
were identical to men’s. A regression relating women’s to men’s total work and
2We classify Belgium, Spain, France, Italy, Ireland and Mexico as Catholic countries, as they are
the only ones with large, at least nominally Catholic majorities.
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Fig. 2 Female–male total work and real GDP per-capita, 27 countries.
F − M Work = 68.16 − 2.39(0.56)RealGDP/Capita; Adj. R2 = 0.394
including an indicator for religious background (equaling one in six countries)
yields:
FemaleTotalWork = 134.05 (51.54) + 0.73 (0.12) MaleTotalWork
+ 17.72 (13.36) Catholic, N = 27, Adj. R2 = 0.590.
(The regression line through the non-Catholic points is the lower of the two
parallel lines in Fig. 1.) We reject the hypotheses that the intercept is zero
and that the slope on MaleTotalWork is one, as well as the joint hypothesis.3
Nonetheless, the slope of the relationship between total work by gender is
economically not that much different from one, and the averages for rich non-
Catholic countries do not differ statistically or economically.
Figure 2 shows a scatter of the difference in average minutes per day of
female over male total work time and real GDP/capita and a line fitting
these points. It suggests either that economic development is highly posi-
tively correlated with gender equality of total work or that today’s rich non-
Catholic countries have always had a different culture along this dimension.
Furthermore, the relationship appears to be nonlinear, with gender equality
being approached or even reached at a sufficiently high level of personal
income.
3The statistic testing the joint hypothesis is F(2,24) = 8.18, p = 0.002.
244 M. Burda et al.
Based on these results we cannot claim that gender equality in total work
holds at all times and places. It does not hold in middle-or lower-income coun-
tries today or in predominantly Catholic countries. Perhaps if more data were
available on still other countries, the conclusion might change; but based on all
the available evidence the results suggest strongly that iso-work characterizes
average household behavior and labor markets in rich non-Catholic countries.
Moreover, the cross-section evidence suggests that iso-work is approached as
real incomes rise.
3 Novelty and knowledge
The iso-work fact has been hinted at by several sociologists. Robinson and
Godbey (1999) show that it describes the average of (recall and time-diary)
data from 14 countries from the 1980s and early 1990s; and Gershuny (2000)
shows that it roughly characterizes the two averages over a similar but still
smaller sample of data sets covering the 1960s through the mid-1990s. No study
has demonstrated it using data sets that were as well-harmonized as those that
we used here, nor has one shown how closely it describes average outcomes in
individual countries.
While iso-work is not new to the sociology literature, it appears not to
have been studied by economists. The difficulty, however, is that it has been
swamped by claims in widely circulated ethnographic studies (Hochschild
1997, and earlier work) based on a few households that women’s total work
significantly exceeds men’s. Indeed, even sociologists who demonstrated it
(e.g., Mattingly and Bianchi 2003, for the United States, and Bittman and
Wajcman 2000, for several countries), downplayed it to focus on claims that
women’s work is more onerous than men’s and that women’s leisure provides
less pleasure.
Whether the possibility of iso-work is well known among economists, other
social scientists and the general public is unclear. To examine this issue, we
designed a survey that asked the following question:
“We know that American men (ages 20–75) on average work more in the
market than do American women. But what is the difference between
men’s TOTAL WORK (in the market and on anything that you might
view as work at home) and that of women? Without consulting any
books, articles or raw data, PLEASE PUT AN X NEXT TO THE LINE
BELOW THAT YOU BELIEVE TO BE THE CLOSEST APPROXI-
MATION TO THE CURRENT SITUATION IN THE US.”
Respondents were allowed nine possible responses, ranging from a 25% excess
of female total work, to symmetry around equality, to a 25% excess of male
total work.
In August 2006 we emailed this survey to three groups: (1) 663 labor econo-
mists affiliated with a worldwide network of such researchers. The survey
distinguished respondents who had spent at least six months in the U.S. from
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Table 1 Expert and other opinion about men’s and women’s total work (percent distributions)
Men work: Labor Labor Elite Sociology Economics
economists economists macro and faculty and principles
familiar unfamiliar public finance graduate students
with US with US economists students
At least 10% less 41.8 50.7 44.8 60.0 43.6
5% less 11.7 11.3 10.5 11.7 12.8
Differ by less than 2.5% 25.8 25.4 34.2 20.0 23.1
5% more 6.1 4.9 3.9 1.7 9.2
At least 10% more 14.6 7.7 6.6 6.6 11.3
N 213 142 76 60 445
t statistic on binomial if 5.47 6.73 4.08 6.08 8.98
“equal” answers are
split evenly
RESPONSE RATE 0.535 0.298 0.286 0.873
Responses to the question: “We know that American men (ages 20–75) on average work more in
the market than do American women. But what is the difference between men’s TOTAL WORK
(in the market and on anything that you might view as work at home) and that of women? Without
consulting any books, articles or raw data, PLEASE PUT AN X NEXT TO THE LINE BELOW
THAT YOU BELIEVE TO BE THE CLOSEST APPROXIMATION TO THE CURRENT
SITUATION IN THE US.”
those who had not; (2) 255 elite macro and public finance economists, mem-
bers of a mostly American network of such researchers; and (3) 210 faculty
members and graduate students in a leading American sociology department.
The first and third groups received follow-up emails three weeks after the
initial survey. Also, early in September 2006 we asked the same question of
533 students in an introductory microeconomics class. Using the information
on location in the first group, we thus have five separate sets of responses.
The results are shown in Table 1, with the categories greater than or equal
to 10% or less than or equal to −10% combined for presentational ease. The
majority of respondents in each group believe that American women perform
at least 5% more total work than men. Assigning half the respondents who
state that there is equality to this category, in all samples we easily reject the
null hypothesis that the proportions stating that men work less or women work
less are equal.4
Despite the apparent gender equality of total work in most rich countries, all
groups considered were unaware of this. It may be the case that most people
are in fact aware of the underlying differences while our samples are simply
unrepresentative; and, as is always true with eliciting information about beliefs,
perhaps the respondents to our surveys were thinking about something other
than the sheer quantity of work—perhaps how onerous it is. Nonetheless, this
evidence suggests as strongly as survey evidence on subjective beliefs can that
people believe women’s total work exceeds men’s in rich countries.
4Even if we were to assign all those stating that there is equality to the “men work more” group,
this null hypothesis would still be rejected in some of the samples.
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4 Explaining the phenomenon: which theories can or cannot?
4.1 Market-based forces
Assuming iso-work is a fair description of behavior in many rich countries,
it is natural to try to explain it as the outcome of market forces that differ
across countries but present women and men within each country with similar
economic choices. This is a difficult task. To start, economic theory would
predict iso-work as a market outcome if men and women: (1) had the same
preferences over work and leisure—or at least could be approximated by
the same representative agent; (2) faced the same market wage, net of taxes
and other costs of participation, and (3) had identical productivity in home
production. To deviate from this set of implausible symmetry conditions and
still obtain iso-work as an equilibrium outcome, additional restrictions on
preferences, prices and endowments are necessary. For example, if goods
produced at home are perfect substitutes for market goods, and the rep-
resentative man and woman have identical Cobb–Douglas preferences over
leisure (and no differential disutility from hours supplied in either type of
work), then the combined supply of hours to market and home production
is constant and identical across gender. Because these assumptions are hardly
more plausible than the symmetric and symmetric-and-equal assumptions, iso-
work as a market outcome seems more likely a coincidence than a central
tendency across economies robustly predicted by theory.
The task becomes even more difficult when we try to explain deviations
from iso-work in developing countries and their tendency to disappear as
economies develop. Assuming substitution effects dominate income effects,
economic theory predicts that a rise in women’s relative wage (i.e., a decline
in the gender wage gap) will lead to more work in the market by women
relative to men. The impact of this increase on the relative amount of home
work should be in the opposite direction, so that the effect of a change in
the gender gap on the relative amounts of total work is ambiguous. Unless,
however, additional market work is offset one-for-one by reduced home work,
a rise in the female relative wage should raise women’s relative total work.
To examine this possibility, we use estimates of the difference between the
logarithms of the medians of the distributions of males’ and females’ wages
produced by Polachek and Xiang (2009) for 19 of the 27 countries used here.
The first two columns in Table 2 present least-squares estimates of equations
describing female–male differences in market and total work across countries
as functions of the gender wage gap. The results on market work are consistent
with an upward-sloping relative supply curve of labor. The market work effect,
however, dominates the household work effect, so that we find that the female–
male gap in total work is also positively related to the female–male wage ratio.
These findings are not affected by the inclusion of real GDP per-capita, as
the estimates in Columns (3) and (4) show, nor are they affected by adding
the indicator for Catholic countries. That the GDP variable is only marginally
statistically significant, whereas Fig. 2 suggested a strong negative relationship
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Table 2 Impact of the gender pay gap on the gender total work (minutes per day)
Dep. var., female– (1) Market (2) Total (3) Market (4) Total (5) Market (6) Total
male total work work work work work work work
Log (female/male 135.5 44.0 182.8 23.47 162.68 55.00
wage)a (73.02) (38.54) (66.96) (37.42) (71.71) (32.34)
Real GDP 4.38 −1.90 3.98 −1.20
per-capita ($000)b (1.78) (1.00) (1.92) (0.87)
Catholic −17.22 33.78
(26.07) (11.76)
Adj. R2 0.120 0.017 0.321 0.149 0.293 0.423
N = 19
Standard errors in parentheses
aFrom Polachek and Xiang (2009)
bFrom Heston et al. (2006)
with a diminishing slope, arises from the exclusion of many of the poorer
countries (for which relative wage data are unavailable). Despite the quality
of the estimates, the equation in Column (6) describes below half of the
variance in the gender difference in total work across countries. The difficulty
is that in 14 of these 19 countries these differences are clustered within 5%
of equality, while the gender wage gaps in these data range from 0.07 to
0.69. Something besides equality in relative wages or differences in per-capita
incomes is causing the pervasive absence of gender differences in total work.
4.2 Bargaining, matching and imitation within couples
A different perspective on iso-work arises from the literature on household
behavior (e.g., Lundberg and Pollak 1996). In this view, the gender wage
gap reflects differences in bargaining power in the household, as it would be
regardless of whether one views spouses’ behavior as described by a unitary or
a collective model. By this criterion, we should expect to observe men working
relatively less in total when female–male relative pay is lower, if preferences
over leisure are normal.5 The estimates in Table 2 imply the opposite result.
Where one might infer that men have more bargaining power, as measured by
relative wages, their total work is in fact greater.
A second possible explanation for some of these facts is that husbands and
wives pay attention to each other’s labor and leisure, and gender equality
5Consider a large class of models in which spouses derive utility from consumption, which is public
and joint to the couple, and separable in leisure, which is the time-budget complement of total
work time. The couple must produce a fixed amount of public consumption at home using a
constant returns production function of each household member’s time, without prejudice to the
relative efficiency of the man or woman. Assume that the joint family decision is to maximize a
weighted sum of utilities of the two household members. The solution to this two-stage problem is
a labor supply rule which implies iso-work if and only if each utility weight equals the percentage
deviation of the respective gender wage from its average. Thus the greater the excess of male over
female wages, the lower men’s total work relative to women’s. See for example Knowles (2011).
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obtains at the means in rich countries because most adult men and women
are married. An explicit test of the notion that gender iso-work is generated by
husbands and wives focusing on each other’s work effort as part of marriage
comes from examining inter-household dispersion in the within-household
gender total work gap using data on couples. This examination is not possible
for the U.S. in 2003, so instead we use the much smaller 1985 U.S. Time Use
Survey. We use averages over 3 days from the 2001/02 German data and over
2 days from the 1992 Australian survey.
Figures 3, 4 and 5 show frequency distributions of within-household
differences between the average daily total work of wives and husbands in the
U.S., Australia and Germany. While the distributions are symmetric around
means of zero, the implied dispersion is large. Regressions within each country
of the wife’s total work time on the husband’s explain only 9% of the variation
in the U.S., 29% of the variation in Australia and 35% in Germany. We do find
evidence of complementarity of spouses’ total work (and thus of leisure), but
most of the dispersion in intra-household differences in total work remains.6
This evidence is inconsistent with the assertion that the iso-work phenomenon
stems from the alignment of behavior within a couple, perhaps not surprising
given the demonstration by Cigno (2009) that iso-work could result from non-
cooperative equilibria, which are less likely within marriage.7
4.3 Social norms
Another possible coordination device that we explore here is a social norm for
leisure that generates a form of interdependent utility among agents and serves
as a focal point for the determination of total work. Social norms have been
increasingly incorporated into economic models, and they provide important
additional insights and modifications into how we view markets as operating
(see Fernández 2010, for a discussion). In our context, peer pressure leading to
a desire to conform to a common social norm for time allocation mutes market
incentives and weakens the impact of individual tastes. As a result, time use
becomes more similar across individuals.8 If the social norm is strong enough
to drive agents to conform fully, we obtain the iso-work result suggested by the
data.9
While there are many variations on the theme, models of social norms have
the following common feature. Absent a social norm, consumers maximize
6See Hamermesh (2002) for evidence of the importance of both the quantitative and timing aspects
of complementarity of spouses’ market work.
7By extension, it is also inconsistent with a model of matching and search in which total hours
worked are chosen to increase the chances of a successful match.
8Social norms have been studied, among many others, by Akerlof (1980), Lindbeck et al. (1999)
and Kooreman (2007).
9In this simple story, total conformity only occurs if the desire to conform is infinitely strong. The
literature on conformity (e.g. Bernheim 1994) has sought ways to obtain identical behavior without
assuming an infinite cost of deviation.












Fig. 3 Wife–husband difference in total work, United States 1985
utility given a standard budget constraint. Common behavior—as an average
of that of members of a given and possibly endogenously determined group—
conditions utility, so equilibrium enforces consistency of the individual’s maxi-
mizing behavior with the group outcome. Deviations from the norm are costly.
A simple model of social norms is not sufficient to rationalize our ob-
servations. The empirical difficulty is that iso-work coexists with significant
within-gender (and more generally within-group) heterogeneity of leisure.
This is inconsistent with a simple single-norm account, because, as the penalty
for deviating increases, the labor supply of each individual converges to a
common, gender-neutral norm regardless of the wage.10 While a strong norm
bridges the gap between male and female leisure, it also suppresses any within-
gender heterogeneity of leisure, which is a central feature of the data.
One way to avoid this feature is to allow multiple local social norms,
unrelated to gender.11 Suppose each gender is stratified into social clusters that
are defined by relative position in the wage distribution. For instance, males
and females above their gender’s median wage may share a common leisure
norm, and there is another leisure norm below the median wage. Agents could
just as well be clustered according to the color of their eyes, the month in which
they are born, or the neighborhood where they live. The crucial assumption is
10This is also true if the sensitivity of leisure to gender wage differences differs by gender.
11For a detailed and formal exposition of this point, see Burda et al. (2007).
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Fig. 4 Wife–husband difference in average total work per day, Australia 1992
that the clusters are defined by gender-neutral characteristics.12 In such models
the greater the number of clusters or interacting groups, the more likely that
iso-work can obtain.
The findings presented in Section 2 make it clear that total work does vary
across countries, region and over time. Since one might rationalize iso-work by
social norms by arguing that they serve as a coordination device between male
and female total work, we must also explain how norms can vary. This is most
simply done by endogenizing the norm.
A social norm theory of leisure can produce the negative relation between
female–male differences in total work and GDP per-capita in various ways.
The first relies on the link between economic development and increased
gender neutrality of social reference groups. A model of social clusters can
account for the reduction in the female–male total work difference as GDP
per-capita grows, provided economic growth is positively correlated with the
adoption of gender-neutral reference groups. Suppose that at low income
levels there are two leisure reference groups: one for men, and one for
women. This might be due to tastes for discrimination, for example, which are
12By contrast, social leisure norms defined in terms of the position of the wage above or below
some arbitrary levels (i.e., a leisure norm for “high” wage males and females, another one for “low”
wage ones) will in general be gender-biased, as the proportions of males and females adopting a
given norm will differ unless the separating levels happen to coincide with median wages.
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Fig. 5 Wife–husband difference in average total work per day, Germany 2001/02
correlated with income level. Then, trivially, iso-work does not hold. If gender-
oriented social clusters are replaced by gender-neutral reference groups as
income rises (e.g., at quantiles of income distributions), development will be
associated with convergence of the total work difference.
A second variant assumes that the cost of deviating from a social norm
is positively related to the wage. Consider the simple one-norm model when
people are harassed for deviating from the norm. Perhaps instead of suffering
the direct utility loss envisaged above, deviants lose time fending off their
critics, mending their reputations, or battling inner guilt feelings at the cost
of time available for work or leisure. At a low wage or level of development,
the weight on the norm is low, so that the intrinsic optimum is the main
determinant of leisure. At a high wage or development level, the social norm
becomes the sole determinant of optimal leisure. As the wage—the value of
time—increases, so does the cost of deviating from the norm, resulting in a
smaller deviation.
A final possibility is that there is a social stigma attached to female participa-
tion in market activities. Goldin (1995) assumes that blue-collar, but not white-
collar work by a woman entails a fixed utility loss. Imagine a simpler scenario
in which any positive female market activity is stigmatized, and there is no
social norm beyond this stigma. If a woman works in the market, her utility
is diminished by a fixed penalty associated with the stigma, while conformity
to stereotyped behavior yields positive additional utility. Staying home is
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optimal as long as the utility differential exceeds the valuation of market
participation.13 Development and the concomitant rise in wages reduce the
impact of gender stereotypes on behavior. In that respect, development makes
men and women behave, ceteris paribus, in increasingly similar ways.14
5 Exploring social norms as an explanation of iso-work
An explanation based on social norms is difficult to test directly but does pro-
vide some guidelines for considering the data. Any test based on arbitrary sub-
groups in which the gender ratio differs is excluded by the theory. Conditioning
on outcomes (e.g., examining differences by gender among paid workers) both
violates the orthogonality condition and confounds effect with cause. We can,
however, perform several indirect tests of the consistency of social norms with
observed behavior. None of these can validate the role of social norms to the
exclusion of other explanations; but each offers a chance to examine whether
social norms are inconsistent with the facts presented here.
One way to examine this is to infer whether differences in attitudes about
gender roles are related to international gender differences in total work.
Respondents in the World Values Surveys (WVS) were asked whether they
agreed with the statement, “When jobs are scarce, men should have more
right to a job than women.” We see this question as indicating that the
society views treating men and women differently as being socially acceptable.
Figure 6 presents a scatter diagram relating averages of these data for the most
recent year before the time-diary survey to the female–male difference in total
work for the 21 of the 27 countries used in Fig. 1 for which they are available.
The scatter and the highly significant relationship between the gender total
work difference and this attitudinal variable suggest that, where the expressed
norm about the labor market favors men, women perform a greater share of
total work.15
One might argue that this diagram merely reflects generalized cultural
differences. To examine this possibility we use a general measure of attitudes
13An alternative justification for the correlation between the strength of social norms and GDP
can be inferred from experimental work conducted in rural Africa (Ensminger 2004). One reason
for the strength of this correlation may be that the physical demands of market work during the
early stages of industrialization penalize women so that they must work more hours in order to
supply the same productive effort as men.
14Of course, it might be that men exaggerate the amount of home production that they undertake
in richer countries, or that women exaggerate the amount of market work that they do. Given the
structure of how time diaries are collected, these seem unlikely. Moreover, additional regressions
on the 27 countries depicted in Fig. 1 show absolutely no relationship between male home
production and real GDP, or female market work and real GDP.
15We also experimented by holding constant for average educational attainment in each country.
While its inclusion did reduce the significance of the equation depicted in Fig. 6, the estimated
effect was still (barely) statistically significant. Educational attainment is affected by the same
cultural forces that determine these attitudes, so that its inclusion in the estimates may be incorrect.
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Fig. 6 Gender total work difference and attitude to job scarcity, 21 countries.
DiffTotalWork = −3.39 + 117.50 (35.16) AgreeJobsMen; Adj. R2 = 0.337
toward work in the WVS: the fraction of respondents agreeing that it would
be unfortunate if there were less emphasis on work in the future. The scatter
of this variable and the gender difference in total work by country is shown in
Fig. 7, along with the regression relating the two. The fit is much worse than
in Fig. 6. Taking this argument one step further, we obtained an attitudinal
measure from the WVS that is unrelated to attitudes about work—the fraction
of respondents stating that they are very proud of their nationality.16 The
scatter and regression of this variable and the gender difference in total work
in Fig. 8 show no relation between the two.17 With no claim of causation, the
exercise does at least suggest a link between differences in total work and
specific attitudes about gender roles in work.
Evidence on norms in this context can be gleaned from the behavior
of immigrants from nearly the same set of countries for which behavior is
depicted in Figs. 6–8 (see Fernández 2007). To examine this we calculate total
work time using diaries from the American Time Use Survey 2003–2006. We
16All the data can be downloaded from http://www.worldvaluessurvey.com/. The second and third
questions on values are: (1) “Please tell me, if it were to happen, whether you think it would be
a good thing, a bad thing, or don’t you mind: Less importance placed on work in our lives.” (2)
“How proud are you to be [Nationality]?”
17If we replace national averages of attitudes in each of these scatters with gender-specific national
averages the results are hardly unchanged, as the correlations of averages of female and male
attitudes in each case exceed 0.9.
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Bad if in future less emphasis on work
Fig. 7 Gender total work difference and attitude to value of market work, 21 countries.
DiffTotalWork = 2.87 + 47.67 (29.32) LessWorkBad; Adj. R2 = 0.078
identified immigrants from 26 countries for which the WVS included responses
to the questions used in Figs. 6–8. We then regressed average total work time
on a number of demographic controls, separately for men and women. If the
social norm hypothesis is not incorrect, male immigrants from those countries
where people believe that men should have priorities on jobs will work less
in total than other immigrants, other things equal, while women from those
countries will work more. At the very least, the difference in the effect of this
attitudinal measure between men and women will be negative.
The results of this estimation are shown in the first two columns of Table 3.
All of the vectors of demographic variables are significant (and ignoring them
does not change the estimates of the impact of the attitudinal variable on total
work time). The crucial variable is not significantly different from zero, The
effects are, however, of opposite sign—negative for men, positive for women,
as expected; and the difference between the effects, shown in the bottom row
of the Table, is significant at the 95% level in a one-sided test.
The impact of attitudes about gender roles on immigrants’ work time is not
small. The table also shows the range of average responses on this question
in the sending countries. Using this range and the difference in the impact of
this measure on work times by gender, the effect of going from the least to the
most “sexist” sending country is 97 min—21% of the average total work time
in this group.
The remaining two pairs of columns in Table 3 present the same
specifications but with the other attitudinal variables substituted sequentially
for attitudes about gender work roles. The differences between the effects of
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Fig. 8 Gender total work difference and pride in nationality, 21 countries.
DiffTotalWork = 19.24 + 10.22 (29.11) VeryProudNationality; Adj. R2 = −0.046
the attitudinal variables on total work time differences by gender are much
smaller and not statistically significant (indeed, the impact of concerns about
the future of work is more positive among men than among women). These
results demonstrate that the estimates in Columns (1) and (2) are specifically
related to attitudes about the gender and work, not to general differences in
attitudes among the sending countries.
A second microeconometric examination of the possible role of social norms
in affecting differences in work times by gender uses the data on couples
in Australia and Germany that underlie Figs. 4 and 5 (the 1985 U.S. data
have too few observations to allow forming reliable group averages that might
reflect peers’ behavior). For each couple (3080 in Germany, 1966 in Australia),
we initially regress wife’s total work on husband’s, with the results shown in
Columns (1) and (5) of Table 4. Following a now-substantial literature on the
role of peer effects in behavior (see Borjas 1992, for an early example), in
Columns (2) and (6) we add to these variables measuring the average work of
wives in the particular wife’s education group (four in Germany; three in Aus-
tralia), age group (<40, 40–54, 55+) and region (West and East in Germany;
New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland, and other jurisdictions in Australia).
Columns (3) and (7) add controls for the wife’s own demographic and family
characteristics. In both countries the addition of these peer outcomes improves
the ability of the equations to describe the wife’s total work conditional on
her husband’s. Except for age for Germany in Column (3), peer outcomes of
similarly-situated wives have significant impacts on the total work of individual
wives.
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Table 3 Home-country social norms and immigrants’ total work time, American Time Use
Survey, 2003–2006
M F M F M F
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Agree men −123.16 46.73
should have (81.23) (70.46)
job priority
Bad if less 54.44 −11.41
emphasis on work (77.02) (58.86)
Very proud of nationality −26.01 −6.49
(59.22) (44.34)
Schooling:
12 years 38.67 −1.68
(29.21) (23.02)
13–15 years 24.03 −19.61
(31.38) (23.48)








Adj. R2 0.0435 0.0351 0.0412 0.0345 0.0408 0.0345
N 659 763 659 763 659 763
Range of [0.125, 0.694] [0.065, 0.719] [0.138, 0.895]
attitudinal variable
Difference in −169.89 65.85 −19.52
effects of (107.53) (96.94) (73.98)
attitudinal variables
Robust standard errors in parentheses beneath parameter estimates, standard error beneath the
differences in effects of the attitudinal variables. Columns (3)–(6) include the same controls as in
Columns (1) and (2)
One might argue that these results merely reflect the reflection problem by
Manski (1995). We cannot demonstrate causation conclusively, but indirect
evidence suggests that our results do not arise solely from the reflection
of one’s own behavior. One solution partitions the German and Australian
samples into halves, calculates peer averages for one half-sample and includes
them in regressions like those in Columns (3) and (6) based only on the other
half-sample. The results of re-estimating the equations on the second half-
samples differ little from those shown in the Table. These similar results cannot
be based on reflections, as the half-samples are different.
Individuals in the half-samples may, however, be responding to their own
unmeasured common characteristics rather than to the behavior of their peers.
There is no way of circumventing this potential difficulty completely, just as
in the larger peer-effects literature extricating common effects from responses
to peers’ outcomes is exceedingly difficult. In the case of Germany, however,
we can probe a bit further by including in the regressions describing wives in
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Table 4 Effects of social norms, married couples, Germany 2001/02, Australia 1992
Dep. var.: Germany Australia
Wife’s total work (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Husband’s 0.491 0.441 0.432 0.447 0.416 0.358 0.355
total work (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016)
Total work 0.298 0.252 −0.404 0.466 0.587
in wife’s (0.081) (0.075) (0.231) (0.111) (0.129)
education group
Age group 0.281 0.055 0.216 0.431 0.231
(0.046) (0.065) (0.033) (0.056) (0.070)
Region 0.722 0.873 0.443 1.276 1.668
(0.159) (0.161) (0.098) (0.518) (0.812)
Norm used Current Current Lagged Current Current
Wife’s education, age Yes Yes
Number and Yes Yes
ages of children
Adj. R2 0.353 0.372 0.377 0.368 0.292 0.325 0.336
N 3080 1966
Standard errors in parentheses. In Germany total work is averaged over 3 days, in Australia it is
averaged over two days. For both countries the age groups are under 40, 40–54 and 55+. There
are four education groups in Germany, three in Australia. Germany is divided into West and East,
Australia into New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland and other jurisdictions
2001/02 peer outcomes based on wives included in a nearly identical survey
in 1991/92. Those results are presented in Column (4) of Table 4 and should
be compared to the results in Column (2). While the impact of wives’ peers’
education is attenuated when we include lagged values, the impacts of peer
outcomes in the same age group and region, although weaker, are still highly
significant statistically.
6 Conclusion: implications for economic modeling
We have presented evidence suggesting that men’s and women’s total work in a
large group of rich countries does not differ significantly and have dubbed this
apparent phenomenon “iso-work.” This phenomenon has been hinted at but
glossed over by a few sociologists but does not appear to have entered into the
conventional wisdom held by economists, sociologists or the public. It could
be important for modeling in a variety of areas of economics, and we have
attempted to explore one of the many potential explanations for it, namely
the idea of social norms. Whether that explanation is the best one is unclear;
but the difficulty accounting for the results with conventional, neoclassical
economic theory is suggestive of the value of models with social interactions.
Our exploration sheds light on what might be required to explain the apparent
iso-work phenomenon.
The first implication of our findings and attempts at explanation is linked to
economic development. Our evidence documents convergence of total work
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across gender with GDP per-capita. We show in Section 4 that this conver-
gence can derive either from increasingly gender-blind assignment to reference
clusters with strong norms, or from a convergence of gender wage-offer distrib-
utions to a common one. The past half century has also seen secular, albeit slow
convergence in gender wage differentials. These two phenomena are probably
related, but what is their source? Has technical change augmented female mar-
ket production relative to that of men? Is technical change in home production
generally labor-saving (see Greenwood et al. 2005)? How have interactions
of these two types of innovation combined to generate convergence in total
work and the returns to market work? Examining these interactions without
considering gender roles (e.g., Ngai and Pissarides 2008) is a useful step; but
given the significant differences in gender roles in less developed countries,
understanding growth and development requires accounting better for the
convergence of total work and changes in the relative amounts of market
and household work performed by men and women. This is especially true
considering the different roles played by physical and intellectual attributes
during economic development (Clark 1940).
Second, household models typically assume that a spouse’s bargaining
power is a function of her/his market earnings. Yet we have shown here, at least
for most rich economies, that gender differences in the amounts of non-work
time are tiny. How can this be true if, as is still the case, men have substantially
higher wage rates and market earnings? Three logical possibilities present
themselves. Men have more power, but are altruistic toward their spouses
and toward women generally, and do not take advantage of it.18 Another is
that economists’ modeling of the household has been incorrect, and market
earnings do not generate power in the household. A final alternative is that
earnings do generate power, men are not altruistic, but the average man’s
utility from his market and home work exceeds that of the average woman’s
from the same total amount of work. This last possibility would formalize
ideas of the few sociologists who have confronted the issue (e.g., Mattingly and
Bianchi 2003). Yet this possibility shifts the discussion to why women find their
work more onerous than men find theirs. Why, e.g., is the marginal minute
spent in an office dealing with recalcitrant colleagues and supervisors more
pleasurable than the marginal minute spent baking a cake?
Our results suggest the potential importance of going beyond standard neo-
classical models to analyze social phenomena. Our inability to use neoclassical
models to predict the patterns and correlates that we have demonstrated and
their apparent consistency with some implications of some models of social
norms suggest that this may be a fruitful approach to the study of labor markets
generally.
18Doepke and Tertilt (2009) present a model in which self-interest motivated by inter-generational
concerns leads men to use their power to grant equal rights to women. Bertocchi (2011) constructs
a model in which concerns by a changing median voter lead to extensions of rights to women.
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DATA APPENDIX: Definitions of Total Work in 27 Countries
United States(US): Market work and work-related activities; travel related to
work; all household activities; caring for and helping household members; con-
sumer purchases; professional and personal care services; household services;
government services; travel related to these.
Australia(AUS): Market work; cleaning and cooking; family and child care;
shopping; and travel associated with each.
Belgium(B), Denmark(DK), France(F), Finland(FI), Sweden(S), United King-
dom(UK), Estonia(ES), Hungary(H), Slovenia(SL), Norway(N): Gainful
work; study; household work + family care; proratio of travel time based on
gainful work time.
Benin(BEN), Madagascar(MAD), Mauritius(MAU), South Africa(SA): Mar-
ket work; domestic and care activities; commuting.
Canada(CD): “Total work” (paid work and related activities; unpaid work
and related activities).
Germany(G): Market work: employment and job search; home work activi-
ties; handicraft/gardening; care and sitting.
Ireland(IE): Care; employment and study; household work; proratio of travel
time based on gainful work time.
Israel(IL): Market work; cooking and cleaning at home; child care.
Italy(I): Market work; professional activities; training; domestic activities;
family care; purchasing goods and services.
Japan(J): Work, school work; house work, caring or nursing, child care,
shopping.
Mexico(MX): Domestic work; care of children and other household mem-
bers; market work.
Netherlands(NL): Occupational work and related travel; household work,
do-it yourself, gardening, etc; childcare; shopping.
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New Zealand(NZ): Paid work; household work, care-giving for household
members, purchasing goods or services, unpaid work for people outside the
home.
Spain(E): Market work; house work, child care, adult care.
Turkey(TR): Employment and job seeking; study; household and family care;
proratio of travel time based on gainful work time.
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